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safeguards must be incorporated into the statute to assure protection of the
motorists' constitutional right to tort action. In evaluating the constitutionality
of a deductible limit or a reduced percentage of recovery, the court should
better balance the need to guarantee compensation against the desire to reduce
duplicate coverage. The statutory threshold should be broadened to guarantee
court access by allowing suits to collect intangible damages for severe, nonpermanent injuries.
TERRI GooDmAN

CIVIL RIGHTS: LAW PARTNERS AS EMPLOYEES
FOR TITLE VII PURPOSES?
Hishon v. King & Spalding,
678 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir. 1982),
cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3544 (Jan. 24, 1983) (No. 82-940).
Appellant filed a Title VIII action against a large Atlanta law firm,2
alleging sex discrimination in its refusal to invite her to partnership in the
firm.

3

The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,4

reasoning that an application of Title VII to partnership decisions would
5
conflict with the firm's constitutional right to freedom of association. The
D.C.A. 1982) (the appellate court reversed a trial court ruling that no-fault was unconstitutional on the basis of FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21).
65. While the innocent victim's substitute remedies may not equate with the waived tort
remedies, the exchange of rights analysis must include the benefits to a motorist as a potential defendant. See Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 22-23, 271 N.E.2d 592, 606 (1971). While
drivers surrender certain tort actions, they receive in exchange immunity from specified
damage claims. See, e.g., Gentile v. Altermatt, 169 Conn. 267, 293, 863 A2d 1, 15 (1975) (noting
benefits of no-fault included prompt payment of monetary losses and immunity from
negligence); Lasky, 296 So. 2d at 14 (in approving no-fault the court addressed the benefits
of immunity and compensation); Pinnick, 360 Mass. at 22-23, 271 N.E2d at 606 (considering
the advantages of payment for losses and immunity from tort action).
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-18, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (1976 & Supp.
II 1978). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) t; fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condition,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; ....
2. The appellee firm consists of approximately 50 partners and employs approximately
50 associate attorneys, along with other support personnel. 678 F.2d 1022, 1028 (l1th Cir.
1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3544 (Jan. 24, 1983) (No. 82-940).
3. Hishon had been an associate attorney with the firm for six years when the firm
first considered her for partnership. Under the firm's "up or out" policy, if an associate was
not invited to become a partner after six years, the associate was allowed to remain with the
firm only for such reasonable period as necessary to secure other employment. Id. at 1024.
4. Id. See also FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(1).
5. 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1303 (N.D. Ga. 1980). The court said that "while the right
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Eleventh Circuit affirmed and HELD, partners are voluntary members, not employees, of partnerships which precludes the application of Title VII to all
partnership decisionsA
Commentators predict increased federal equal employment opportunity
litigation involving charges of professional level employment discrimination.7
Future actions will undoubtedly focus on professional businesses organized
as partnerships, 8 such as lawyers, 9 accountants and physicians. 10 Title VII
explicitly includes partnerships in its definition of employers,," thereby providing for Title VII suits by employees of partnerships.' 2 The difficulty in
applying Title VII to partner selection stems from the Act's silence and the
courts' confusion in deciding whether a partner is an employee of a partnerof defendant to freedom of association seems clear, the coverage of the act seems doubtful and
obscure. The court is humbly aware that in reaching this conclusion it may have erred." Id.
at 1306. But see Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
("The court's decision to apply Title VII in [a case dealing with promotion of an associate
attorney to a partnership position] does not infringe upon any . . . freedom of association
of the members of defendant law firm.").
6. 678 F.2d at 1028-29. The court determined that the meaning of "employment opportunities" should not be extended to include partnership decisions. Id.
7. See, e.g., Bardeen, The Legal Profession: A New Target for Title VII?, 55 CAL. ST.
B.J. 360, 365 (1980) ("Title VII litigation, with the legal profession as the target, is on the
upswing."); Waintroob, The Developing Law of Equal Employment Opportunity at the
White Collar and Professional Level, 21 WM. & MARY L. REv. 45, 45 (1979).
8. The Uniform Partnership Act § 6(1) defines a partnership as "an association of two
or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." 6 U.L.A. 22 (1969).
9. Title VII has rarely been used in the legal profession. A brief survey reveals only the
following cases: Frausto v. Legal Aid Society, 563 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1977) (dismissal of
Mexican-American attorney's suit alleging discriminatory hiring practices was supported by
record of legitimate nonracial and nondiscriminatory reasons for his not being hired); Milton
v. Bell Laboratories, 428 F. Supp. 502 (D.N.J. 1977) (research corporation's decision not to
hire black attorney required close scrutiny to reveal possible masked racial bias, but decision
here was not based on plaintiff's race); Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (alleged discrimination during associate attorney's employment with large
law firm and alleged unlawful termination in its refusal to elevate him to partnership are
Title VII causes of action); EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. IlL. 1975) (professional nature of law firm did not exempt it from Title VII discrimination suit by discharged
secretary); Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 59 F.R.D. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (female law student
not hired by a large New York law firm was entitled to bring a class action suit on behalf of all
qualified women who had been or would be denied employment because of their sex), appeal
dismissed, 496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1974).
10. See H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 19, at 46 (2d ed. 1970) ("Numerically, there are
more partnerships than business corporations [in the United States]" and "of practicing
American attorneys, some one-third practice as partners in law partnerships [as of 1970]."). See
also U.S. BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRAcT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1981, 1, 184 (102d
ed. 1981) (indicating that approximately 17% of all legal establishments operated as partnerships in 1977).
11. The Act defines an "employer" as any "person" engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has 15 or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976). Partnerships are included in the definition of "person." Id. § 2000e(a).
12. See, e.g., Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (large
law partnership qualified as an employer and an associate attorney as an employee within the
meaning of the Act); EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (secretary at
law firm alleging discrimination in employment entitled to Title VII protection).
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ship.2s An affirmative response to this question would provide Title VII protection to all aspects of the partner's employment status, including promotion
4
to that position.'
The entity theory of partnership recognizes a partnership as a unit having
rights and duties distinct from its individual members,'15 and provides a basis
for characterizing partners as both members and employees of a partnership. In
Bellis v. United States,16 the Supreme Court applied the entity theory to a

three-member law partnership to hold that an individual partner's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination did not shield the partnership's
financial records from a grand jury. The Court noted that many powerful
private partnerships are closer in size, structure, and impersonality to corporations than to voluntary associations. 7 The Court found that even the small law
firm in Bellis had established an institutional identity independent of its

individual partners.' 8 Although Bellis involved a partner's fifth amendment

privilege, the opinion suggests that a business' choice of organization should
not immunize it from constitutional or statutory limitations. 9

Federal case law provides other bases for determining that a partner is an
"employee" for purposes of statutory protection. One test has been dubbed the
13.

See Note, Applicability of Federal AntidiscriminationLegislation to the Selection of

a Law Partner,76 MicH. L. R-v.282, 285-86 (1977). A related issue is whether advancement
to partnership status is an employment opportunity for purposes of Title VII. In the instant
case, appellant argued that elevation to partnership is thus protected. 678 F.2d at 1026. The
court rejected this contention. Id. at 1028. The first court to rule on the application of Title
VII to the law partner selection process answered this question affirmatively. Lucido v.
Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The Lucido court determined
that the plaintiff's claims of discrimination with respect to work assignments, training, rotation and outside work opportunities constituted allegations of discrimination with respect
to "terms, conditions or privileges of employment" and "employment opportunities." Id. at
127. The court in the instant case expressly disagreed with the Lucido court's holding that an
opportunity to become a partner at Cravath was a "term, condition or privilege of employment" and an "employment opportunity." 678 F.2d at 1029.
14. The instant court noted that if partners are deemed employees of the partnership,
rather than owners, an employment relationship might exist, rendering Title VII applicable to
partnership decisions. Id. at 1026 n.7. See generally Note, supra note 13, at 286-92 (explaining
application of "partner as employee" analysis to Title VII).
15. J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 3 (1968) [hereinafter cited as J.
CRANE]. This theory is contrary to the aggregate theory, under which a partnership is merely
the aggregate of its individual partners and has no identity, rights or duties apart from them.
Common law traditionally treated partnerships as aggregates, however, the entity theory is
predominant in civil law jurisdictions, codes and in judicial usage. Id. at 18-19.
16. 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
17. Id. at 93-94. See also J. CRANE, supra note 15, at 19-20: ("[N]o corporation is more
entity-like than a large law or accounting firm which has been going for generations ...
with dozens or hundreds of partners (of whom only a handful, as managing partners or an
executive committee, make major decisions.").
18. 417 US. at 96-97.
19. The Bellis Court said, for example, that: "[1]t is inconceivable that a brokerage house
with offices from coast to coast handling millions of dollars of investment transactions annually
should be entitled to immunize its records from SEC scrutiny solely because it operates as a
partnership rather than in the corporate form." Id. at 97. See also Note, Tenure and Partnership as Title VII Remedies, 94 HARv. L. REv. 457, 476 (1980) ("mhe partnership form of
organization should not furnish a shield to avoid compliance with Title VII.').
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"economic reality" test because it requires courts to define "employee" with
reference to the purpose of the particular employment act in question and
the economic relationship of the parties. 20 Courts most often apply this test
when determining whether an individual is an employee or an independent
contractor. Factors such as the extent of the employer's right to control the
means and manner of the worker's performance, and the worker's opportunity
21
to share in the business' profits and losses are considered.
The economic reality test has been employed by courts interpreting various
employment statutes22 including Title VII,23 but no court has applied it by
name to the partnership context. However, in Burke v. Friedman,24 the Seventh
Circuit determined that the four partners in an accounting firm could not be
regarded as employees of the partnership for Title VII purposes because they
jointly managed, controlled, and shared in the profits and losses of the
business.25 Applying a similar analysis, one federal district court determined
that a lack of financial interest in the business, along with an absence of
managerial discretion or a share of the profits, was evidence of employee status
entitled to Fair Labor Standards Act protection.26 These cases use the economic
reality test, although not by name, and support the proposition that it is the
circumstances of employment, not the labels attached, that should be determinative in questions of statutory protection.27
The Fifth Circuit, in Calderon v. Martin County,28 provided the most
comprehensive test for determining the status of an employee under Title VII.
The district court had dismissed a deputy sheriff's Title VII action, holding
that he was not an employee for purposes of the Act. 29 The district court based
its holding on decisions by Florida courts, for purposes other than Title VII,
which held deputy sheriffs were "appointees" rather than employees. 30 The
20. This test is derived from the opinion of the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 129 (1944). There the Court determined that "newsboys" were
employees under the National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 131-32.
21. Donovan v. Tehco, Inc., 642 F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1981); Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613
F.2d 826, 831-32 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
22. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961) (Fair Labor
Standards Act); United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713-14 (1947) (Social Security Act); NLRB
v. Hearst Publications Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 129 (1944) (National Labor Relations Act).
23. See, e.g., Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 1980);
Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
24. 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977).
25. Id. at 869.
26. Marshall v. R & M Erectors, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 771, 781 (Del. 1977). The employee in
Marshall had been offered a partnership share in the construction business and thought he
had already received a partnership share payment. The court nonetheless found him an "employee." Id. See also Peterson v. Eppler, 67 N.Y.S.2d 498 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946) (party named as
junior partner in accounting partnership agreement was actually an employee because of his
lack of co-ownership and absence of management rights).
27. See Paone & Reis, Effective Enforcement of Federal Nondiscrimination Provisions in
the Hiring of Lawyers, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 615, 639-40 (1967) (suggesting that federal nondiscrimination protections should apply to those law firm partners who "are in fact employees, but . . . are labelled 'partners.' ").
28. 639 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1981).
29. Id. at 272.
30. Id. "Appointee" status meant sheriffs would come under the exemption specified in
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Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that a plaintiffs employee status
under Title VII is a question of federal law and is to be ascertained through
consideration of four factors: the statutory language of the Act, its legislative
history, existing federal case law, and the particular circumstances of the case
at hand.31
The instant court addressed whether partners at appellee law firm were
employees under Title VII.3 2 The court rejected the entity theory early in its
opinion33 and declared the Calderon test to be the best framework for determining the employee status of partners. 4 Following the Calderon factors, the court
first looked to the statutory language of the Act and found no guidance, as an
employee is defined only as "an individual employed by an employer."3 5 Likewise the court determined the legislative history was inconclusive.6 Examining
the third Calderonfactor, existing federal case law, the court acknowledged the
economic reality test used in other employment statute cases, but declined to
apply it in the instant case.37 The court chose instead to follow the traditional
partnership principles espoused in Burke, stating that it shared the Seventh
Circuit's reluctance to equate partners with employees.A8
Finally, the court looked at the particular facts of the instant case, and
found a clear indication that the partnership was a voluntary association of
attorneys practicing law as joint venturers, and not an entity analogous to a
corporation.3 9 The court placed great emphasis on the fact that the partners
owned the partnership and were thus not its employees under Title VII. 0
Therefore, the court was unwilling to dictate partnership decisions under the
guise of employee promotions protected by Title VII. 41
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(t) (1976) (providing that the term "employee" shall not include an
appointee of a person elected to public office in any state or political subdivision).
31. 639 F. 2d at 272-73.
32. 678 F.2d at 1026. Appellant presented the court with three theories upon which to
grant jurisdiction under Title VII. First, partners at appellee law firm are "employees" within
the scope of Title VII. Second, elevation to partnership is an "employment opportunity" or a
"term, condition or privilege of employment" under Title VII. Finally, appellant contended
that her termination under the firm's "up or out" policy was a wrongful discharge under
the Act. Id. While the court found none of these arguments convincing, it focused primarily
on appellant's first theory of partner as employee and its decision on it resolved the remaining theories as well.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1027 n.9.
35. Id. at 1027.
36. The legislative history revealed only that "employee" was to have its common
dictionary meaningi Id. (quoting from 110 CONG. REc. 7216 (1964) (statement of Sen. Joseph
S. Clark)).
37. Id. at 1027 n.9.
38. Id. at 1028.
39. Id. The court cited the facts that the firm operated as a partnership under the laws
of Georgia, filed tax returns as a partnership, was comprised of fifty active partners and
employed approximately fifty associates along with other personnel, and had a lengthy and
detailed partnership agreement. Id.
40.

Id.

41. Id. The court also held that promotion to a partnership position was not an "employment opportunity" under the statute; and that termination of employment as a result of
failure to make partner was not a "discharge" within the protective ambit of Title VII. Id. at
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The court rejected the entity theory established in Bellis, conclusorily
stating that although a partnership may be a separate entity for many purposes,
Title VII is not one of them. 42 Later, the court examined the first Calderon
factor and declared the Act's statutory language not helpful. 43 A more thorough
examination of the Act, however, would have revealed Title VII's definition
of "person" to include partnerships, 4 which evidences legislative intent to
treat partnerships as entities. 4s Thus, the first Calderon factor leads to the use
of the entity theory. That theory suggests partners may be employees of the
partnership "entity."
The second Calderon test factor, the legislative history of Title VII, was
also incompletely examined by the instant court. The court noted that little
history exists; 46 but failed to look carefully at the purpose of the Act. Calderon
mandates examination of the Act's history, which surely includes consideration
of the Act's purpose. Both the intent and purpose of Title VII were to
eliminate discrimination in employment wherever necessary, 47 including at the
professional level. 48 Further, in reviewing existing federal case law pursuant to
the third Calderon factor, the instant court overlooked the pattern in discrimination cases of broad statutory construction to effectuate the purposes of
equal employment legislation. 49
1028-29. Judge Tjoflat, in his dissent, disagreed with the latter holding. Id. at 1030 (Tjoflat,
J., dissenting).
42. 678 F.2d at 1026. The court merely stated, "[f]or many purposes . . . this 'separate
identity' will yield results similar to those for corporations, but not for Title VII purposes."
Id.
43. Id. at 1027.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1976). See supra note 11.
45. J. CRANE, supra note 15, at 25 (the authors state that legislatures will treat partnerships as entities by defining operative words like "person" to include partnerships).
46. 678 F.2d at 1027. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (federal courts are empowered to make victims of discrimination whole); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cit.
1971) (liberal interpretation of Civil Rights Act is needed to effectuate congressional goals),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th
Cir. 1970) ("It is ... the duty of the courts to make sure that the Act works, and the intent
of Congress is not hampered by a combination of a strict construction of the statute and a
battle with semantics.").
48. See 118 CONG. REc., 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3802 (1972) (Sen. Jacob K. Javits opposing an
amendment that would have excluded hospital-employed physicians from Title VII coverage).
See also EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175, 180 (N.D. Ill. 1975) ("The courts [have
concluded] that, since the primary objective of Title VII is the elimination of the major
social ills of job discrimination, discriminatory practices in professonal fields are not immune
from attack.").
The need to prevent discriminatory employment practices is pronounced among the
professions that have been traditionally inaccessible to women and members of racial or
ethnic minority groups. See U.S. BUREAU OF TnE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRAcr OF THE UNITED

STATES: 1981 402 (102d ed. 1981) (women comprise 12.8% of the lawyers and judges in the
United States, while blacks and other non-white minorities constitute 4.2%; women constitute
12.9% of physicians, dentists and related practitioners, while blacks and others comprise 8.2%;
women comprise 36.2% of accountants, while blacks and others constitute only 8.2%).
49. See supra note 47. The failure to recognize the existing case law establishing broad
statutory construction to reach the Act's purpose is also a failure under the second Calderon
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The court acknowledged the economic reality test in its review of existing
case law but refused to follow it50 The court stated its preference for the
Calderon test-1 but failed to tealize that the tests are not mutually exclusive.
Thit is particularly obvious since one factor in Calderon is existing federal case
law, and existing federal eate law supports the use of the economic reality test.5 2
The economic reality test, like Calderon's second factor, requires courts to look
to the purpose of the Act, 53 The instant court abandoned the economic reality
test in favor of the Seventh Circuit's reasoning based on partnership principles
in Burke5 4 The Burke analysis in fact examined economic reality to determine
employee 8tatuW. 55
The Galderon factors support rather than preclude, using both the entity
theory and the economic tealitq test. The fourth Galderonfactor, the particular
facts Of each case, is functionally the economic reality test. These "facts", however, can be superficially examined. Fot example, the instant court noted that
the law firm was a partnership by law, filed its tax returns as a partnership, 56
and was owned by the partners,57 but it failed both to examine the realities of
the large-firm organizational structure, and to evaluate the decisionmaking
aUthority of the partners. In uits, the court based its decision upon partnership
principles but did not look behind the label partnership to determine if the
instant firm had the characteristics generally attributed to partnership.
This leaves an important question unanswered for courts faced with similar
Title VII actions: whether the result should be different in a case with evidence
that some partners are actually junior partners or partners in title only,15
which is a common characteristic of large partnerships.5 9 If the court had more
factor to examine the legislative history or purpose of the Act. See supra text accompanying
notes 48-50.
50. 678 F.2d at 1027 & n.9. See supra text accompanying note 87.
51. 678 F.2d at 1027.
52. The instant court recognized that the economic reality test had been applied in
several cases dealing with employment statutes. Id. at 1027 n.9. The court cited to NLRB v.
Hearst Publications Co., 822 US. 111 (1944) (construing term "employee" under NLRA) and
Donovan v. Tehco, Inc., 642 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1981) (determining employee status for purposes
of the Fair Labor Standards Act) as authority for the use of the test. 678 F.2d at 1027 n9. The
court further noted it has been applied in Title VII cases. Id.

53. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
54. 678 F.2d at 1027.

55. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 39.
57.

678 F.2d at 1028. An examination of a partner's ownership rights seems consistent

with the economic reality test, as the equivalent of a worker's opportunity to share in the
profits and losses of the business. Because some firms accord "partners" ownership rights but
no decisionmaking, or management votes but no ownership rights, this factor should not be
the sole determinant. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
58. The opinion of the lower court in the instant case indicates that the plaintiff sought
evidence relating to the division of partnership points and the income received by various

partners in the appellee law firm, presumably to determine whether some partners were
actually junior partners or partners in title only. The district court denied the plaintiff's requests, stating, "the information sought is simply none of plaintiff's business." 24 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. at 1304.
59. See E. SMIGEL, THE WALL Smznr LAwmE 156-60 (1964) (the author describes the
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carefully examined the characteristics of this partnership, as required under
the economic reality test, it could have set a clearer standard for other courts
deciding whether a partner is an employee for Title VII purposes.
The court declared that it did not presume to exalt form over substance.60
Allowing a law firm to evade equal employment legislation by its choice of
organization, that is, its form, is not only a departure from precedent but a
denial of the very substance of Title VII's equal employment opportunity for
6
all. 1

ANDREA ZELMAN
differing status and responsibilities of "junior," "middle" and "senior" partners in large law
firms). Compare Nelson, Practice and Privilege: Social Change and the Structure of Large
Law Firms, 1981 A.B.A. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 95, 118-26 (a more recent analysis of the structure
of large law firms; dividing partners into categories of "finders, minders and grinders') with
Paone & Reis, supra note 27 (suggesting that nondiscrimination protections should apply to
those who are partners in title only).
60. 678 F.2d at 1028.
61. For a related view, see Olmstead, Law as a Business: The Impact of Title VII on the
Legal "Industry", 10 VAL. U.L. REv. 479, 479 (1976) (suggesting that the opinion of lawyers
that Title VII is inapplicable to the practice of law is actually responsible for much of the
discrimination in legal employment).
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